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Guru Granth Sahib
Composition, Arrangement & Layout
ਜਪੁ | Jup
ਸੋ ਦਰੁ | So Dar
ਸੋਹਿਲਾ | Sohilaa
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਿਰੀਰਾਗੁ | Raag Siree-Raag
Gurbani (14-53)
Ashtpadiyan (53-71)
Gurbani (71-74)
Pahre (74-78)
Chhant (78-81)
Vanjara (81-82)
Vaar Siri Raag (83-91)
Bhagat Bani (91-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਝ | Raag Maajh
Gurbani (94-109)
Ashtpadi (109)
Ashtpadiyan (110-129)
Ashtpadi (129-130)
Ashtpadiyan (130-133)
Bara Maha (133-136)
Din Raen (136-137)
Vaar Maajh Ki (137-150)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗਉੜੀ | Raag Gauree
Gurbani (151-185)
Quartets/Couplets (185-220)
Ashtpadiyan (220-234)
Karhalei (234-235)
Ashtpadiyan (235-242)
Chhant (242-249)
Baavan Akhari (250-262)
Sukhmani (262-296)
Thittee (296-300)
Gauree kii Vaar (300-323)
Gurbani (323-330)
Ashtpadiyan (330-340)
Baavan Akhari (340-343)
Thintteen (343-344)
Vaar Kabir (344-345)
Bhagat Bani (345-346)
ਰਾਗੁ ਆਸਾ | Raag Aasaa
Gurbani (347-348)
Chaupaday (348-364)
Panchpadde (364-365)
Kaafee (365-409)
Aasaavaree (409-411)
Ashtpadiyan (411-432)
Patee (432-435)
Chhant (435-462)
Vaar Aasaa (462-475)
Bhagat Bani (475-488)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੂਜਰੀ | Raag Goojaree
Gurbani (489-503)
Ashtpadiyan (503-508)
Vaar Gujari (508-517)
Vaar Gujari (517-526)
ਰਾਗੁ ਦੇਵਗੰਧਾਰੀ | Raag Dayv-Gandhaaree
Gurbani (527-536)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਹਾਗੜਾ | Raag Bihaagraa
Gurbani (537-556)
Chhant (538-548)
Vaar Bihaagraa (548-556)
ਰਾਗੁ ਵਡਹੰਸ | Raag Wadhans
Gurbani (557-564)
Ashtpadiyan (564-565)
Chhant (565-575)
Ghoriaan (575-578)
Alaahaniiaa (578-582)
Vaar Wadhans (582-594)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੋਰਠਿ | Raag Sorath
Gurbani (595-634)
Asatpadhiya (634-642)
Vaar Sorath (642-659)
ਰਾਗੁ ਧਨਾਸਰੀ | Raag Dhanasaree
Gurbani (660-685)
Astpadhiya (685-687)
Chhant (687-691)
Bhagat Bani (691-695)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਤਸਰੀ | Raag Jaitsree
Gurbani (696-703)
Chhant (703-705)
Vaar Jaitsaree (705-710)
Bhagat Bani (710)
ਰਾਗੁ ਟੋਡੀ | Raag Todee
ਰਾਗੁ ਬੈਰਾੜੀ | Raag Bairaaree
ਰਾਗੁ ਤਿਲੰਗ | Raag Tilang
Gurbani (721-727)
Bhagat Bani (727)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੂਹੀ | Raag Suhi
Gurbani (728-750)
Ashtpadiyan (750-761)
Kaafee (761-762)
Suchajee (762)
Gunvantee (763)
Chhant (763-785)
Vaar Soohee (785-792)
Bhagat Bani (792-794)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਲਾਵਲੁ | Raag Bilaaval
Gurbani (795-831)
Ashtpadiyan (831-838)
Thitteen (838-840)
Vaar Sat (841-843)
Chhant (843-848)
Vaar Bilaaval (849-855)
Bhagat Bani (855-858)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੋਂਡ | Raag Gond
Gurbani (859-869)
Ashtpadiyan (869)
Bhagat Bani (870-875)
ਰਾਗੁ ਰਾਮਕਲੀ | Raag Ramkalee
Ashtpadiyan (902-916)
Gurbani (876-902)
Anand (917-922)
Sadd (923-924)
Chhant (924-929)
Dakhnee (929-938)
Sidh Gosat (938-946)
Vaar Ramkalee (947-968)
ਰਾਗੁ ਨਟ ਨਾਰਾਇਨ | Raag Nat Narayan
Gurbani (975-980)
Ashtpadiyan (980-983)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਲੀ ਗਉੜਾ | Raag Maalee Gauraa
Gurbani (984-988)
Bhagat Bani (988)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਰੂ | Raag Maaroo
Gurbani (889-1008)
Ashtpadiyan (1008-1014)
Kaafee (1014-1016)
Ashtpadiyan (1016-1019)
Anjulian (1019-1020)
Solhe (1020-1033)
Dakhni (1033-1043)
ਰਾਗੁ ਤੁਖਾਰੀ | Raag Tukhaari
Bara Maha (1107-1110)
Chhant (1110-1117)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕੇਦਾਰਾ | Raag Kedara
Gurbani (1118-1123)
Bhagat Bani (1123-1124)
ਰਾਗੁ ਭੈਰਉ | Raag Bhairo
Gurbani (1125-1152)
Partaal (1153)
Ashtpadiyan (1153-1167)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਸੰਤੁ | Raag Basant
Gurbani (1168-1187)
Ashtpadiyan (1187-1193)
Vaar Basant (1193-1196)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਾਰਗ | Raag Saarag
Gurbani (1197-1200)
Partaal (1200-1231)
Ashtpadiyan (1232-1236)
Chhant (1236-1237)
Vaar Saarang (1237-1253)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਲਾਰ | Raag Malaar
Gurbani (1254-1293)
Partaal (1265-1273)
Ashtpadiyan (1273-1278)
Chhant (1278)
Vaar Malaar (1278-91)
Bhagat Bani (1292-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਾਨੜਾ | Raag Kaanraa
Gurbani (1294-96)
Partaal (1296-1318)
Ashtpadiyan (1308-1312)
Chhant (1312)
Vaar Kaanraa
Bhagat Bani (1318)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਲਿਆਨ | Raag Kalyaan
Gurbani (1319-23)
Ashtpadiyan (1323-26)
ਰਾਗੁ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਤੀ | Raag Prabhaatee
Gurbani (1327-1341)
Ashtpadiyan (1342-51)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਜਾਵੰਤੀ | Raag Jaijaiwanti
Gurbani (1352-53)
Salok | Gatha | Phunahe | Chaubole | Swayiye
Sehskritee Mahala 1
Sehskritee Mahala 5
Gaathaa Mahala 5
Phunhay Mahala 5
Chaubolae Mahala 5
Shaloks Bhagat Kabir
Shaloks Sheikh Farid
Swaiyyae Mahala 5
Swaiyyae in Praise of Gurus
Shaloks in Addition To Vaars
Shalok Ninth Mehl
Mundavanee Mehl 5
ਰਾਗ ਮਾਲਾ, Raag Maalaa
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Pakistan on Fire and Its Effects on India
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<blockquote data-quote="dalvinder45" data-source="post: 225080" data-attributes="member: 26009"><p>Pakistani Terrorists who are active in Poonch and Rajouri are not relying on random locals for logistics, guidance <em>etc</em>.' 'They are being supported by a selected few who are being vetted, cleared and directed from across the LoC.'</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2024/jan/15indian-army-romeo-force2.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: The Indian Army's Romeo Force and Poonch police personnel keep vigil at the LKG forest in Poonch, January 14, 2024, during a search operation. Photograph: ANI Photo</p><p></p><p>The security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has been dynamic. In my opinion, newer hot spots could emerge wherever 'operational space' is available to the terrorists to gravitate. However, in this changing security situation, two factors have remained constant.</p><p></p><p><strong>a.</strong> Pakistan continues to pursue sponsoring terrorism through her proxies as a State policy.</p><p><strong>b.</strong> Security forces in Jammu & Kashmir, specially the Indian Army, have continued to function with utmost dedication and zeal and made repeated sacrifices to bring stability and calm to the region.</p><p></p><p>In a situation of temporary setbacks, the security forces have shown resolve to bounce back and get on top of the situation.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/22security-forces1.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: Security forces conduct a search operation in the forest area of Dera ki Gali. Photograph: ANI Photo</p><p></p><p>The region has witnessed a cycle of violence in the past, both in the depth areas and along the Line of Control. As recently as early 2020, the LoC was active. High intensity ceasefire violations, raids on posts, ambushes, mutilation of bodies was happening. Whereas, the depth areas were calm and incident free for a long time. The Poonch and Rajouri areas have been activated by design. Probably the number of terrorists is not large, but they have fool-proof communication with handlers across the LoC who coordinate their logistics and provide operational directions. Terrorists in Poonch and Rajouri are not dependent on locals, therefore HUMINT <em>[human intelligence]</em> is void.</p><p>Why has this area been re-activated:</p><p><strong>a.</strong> The counter terrorism grid is not as thick in Kashmir after troops were relocated to the Line of Actual Control.</p><p><strong>b.</strong> The terrorists who were existing and lying dormant, know the area. The terrain favours them and Pakistan wants to keep the pot boiling, probably below our threshold level.</p><p>The jungles pose additional challenges for the conduct of operations. Mountains with jungles further compound the problems. Visibility is restricted, so is the field of fire and engagement ranges. Area weapons like mortars and rocket launchers, MMGs <em>[Medium Machine Guns]</em> etc are less effective. The logistics, casualty evacuation, movement of reserves is time consuming. The range of communication sets reduce and helicopters/drone support is difficult. The jungle terrain is favourable for small team ops and the one who knows the jungle can use it to his advantage.</p><p></p><p>Trrorists in Poonch and Rajouri are operating from hideouts within the jungle. Their presence and movements are concealed; they carry out an incident and melt back. They periodically change hideouts and leave no tell-tale signs. Operations involving large body of troops is prone to detection, ambushes, IED etc. Cordon and search or seek and destroy operations can result in casualties and fatigue to troops.</p><p>Troops trained to operate in small teams, self-contained for a protracted period, and who are able to conceal their presence are more effective in the jungles.</p><p>They can be in the jungle, watch activity, choose the time and place and strike. Ops like ambushes and raids are more successful in jungles.</p><p>Although basic training to soldiers includes some aspects of operations in jungles and the same is further refreshed during pre-induction training -- however, limited training only serves limited purpose. It meets the requirement of clearing small patches during ops with fire support to avoid casualties.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/27security4.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: Security personnel keep vigil in the Poonch sector. Photograph: ANI Photo</p><p></p><p>While the troop deployment along the LoC is to maintain the sanctity of the LoC, a strong anti-infiltration obstacle is in place to deny infiltration. Deployment on the LoC includes obstacles in the form of a formidable fence with a surveillance system, various kinds of sensors, cameras (day and night) and the LoC is manned by troops with weapons with day/night visions.</p><p>All aspects are important. While technology is an enabler to improve efficiency and operational effectiveness of soldiers, training and proficiency of soldiers to use the ground to their advantage is equally important. However, overreliance on technology and ignoring human aspects is fraught with dangers.</p><p>The Bakharwals and Gujjars of the Poonch and Rajouri area played a key role in improving the security situation. They stood up against the terrorists, assisted the Indian Army in clearance of Hill Kaka the so-called 'liberated area'. They have supported the Indian Army in the past; they do it now, and in my opinion, will continue to do so.</p><p>The increase in terrorist incidents is not because the Bakharwals and Gujjars are not providing information. These terrorists who are active in Poonch and Rajouri are not relying on random locals for logistics, guidance <em>etc</em>. They are being supported by a selected few who are being vetted, cleared and directed from across the LoC.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/28rajnath-singh-army-visit4.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>IMAGE: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh meets with locals and officials in Rajouri.</p><p>Jammu and Kashmir Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha, COAS General Manoj C Pande and Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General Upendra Dwivedi are also seen. Photograph: ANI Photo</p><p>In the December 21 ambush, terrorists had positioned themselves on hill tops and chose a blind curve on the road to target army vehicles. This shows how well-informed they were about the terrain.</p><p>Could you throw some light on the ecosystem that exists between terrorists, smugglers and local informants that enables such attacks? It's true that the terrorists selected an ambush site from where they could cause maximum damage and make a quick getaway. This indicates that they have received training from the Pakistan army. Also without guidance as recce, a copy book style action is difficult to execute.</p><p>They surely would have received support and information from some over-the-ground workers who could freely move around and inform them of troop movement, numbers, timings, <em>etc</em>.It is the narco-smuggler nexus that is providing support.</p><p></p><p>It is surely by design and directions from across the LoC. Probably to keep the pot boiling, they have chosen a favourable area. In Srinagar, as compared to Poonch and Rajouri, operations can be launched in a faster time-frame due to the terrain and thick counter-terrorism deployment. The flow of information to local police and Indian Army is more due to the density of population. The narco-smuggler nexus, supported through tactical drones, is strong in the Poonch and Rajouri region.</p><p>Also, handlers are able to directly communicate with terrorists and selected over-the-ground workers without use of communication systems that can be intercepted and monitored.Also, due to relocation of forces to the Line of Actual Control, the already thin deployment has further depleted.</p><p></p><p>Repeated incidents in Poonch and Rajouri is a matter of concern. Sacrifices made to bring peace to this area cannot be allowed to go in vain.</p><p>While local formations will honestly draw lessons, make required corrections in operational techniques, battle procedures and drills, they will also deploy additional resources under their command and revisit training curriculum focussing on intelligence aspects.</p><p>Some other measures that need to be considered are:</p><p><strong>a.</strong> Deny operational space to the terrorists by deploying additional troops from outside the command theatre.</p><p><strong>b.</strong> Counter infiltration grid in this area is strong, however an audit to identify weak spots and plug them is required.</p><p><strong>c.</strong> Infusion of hi-tech equipment to improve operational effectiveness of the troops is urgently required. These include anti-drone systems, foliage penetration radars, precision strike tactical drones, communication interception equipment <em>etc</em>.</p><p><strong>d.</strong> Securing of lines of communication by forces other than the Indian Army needs to be considered.</p><p>This will deny terrorists freedom of movement in vehicles from across the Poonch and Rajouri and from the International Border sector side.</p><p><strong>e.</strong> The nexus between narco/smugglers and terrorists needs to be neutralised on priority. There is a requirement to go after the big players in the business rather than small time drug peddlers. This task cannot be left to local security forces/agencies, but a multi-agency effort at a higher level would yield results.</p><p><strong>f.</strong> Right sizing of forces/drawing down of the Rashtriya Rifles needs to be reconsidered, especially in the light of commitment on the LAC and requirement of more boots on the ground in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism.</p><p><strong>g.</strong> Lastly, handlers across the LoC should also feel the heat. They cannot sit in safe sanctuaries and perpetuate violence.</p><p></p><p>A strong message to Pakistan that there cannot be business as usual on the LoC when depth areas are being targeted.</p><p>Based an interview by Lieutenant General <strong>Paramjit Singh Sangha</strong>, former deputy chief of the army staff (strategy) by Rediff</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="dalvinder45, post: 225080, member: 26009"] Pakistani Terrorists who are active in Poonch and Rajouri are not relying on random locals for logistics, guidance [I]etc[/I].' 'They are being supported by a selected few who are being vetted, cleared and directed from across the LoC.' [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2024/jan/15indian-army-romeo-force2.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: The Indian Army's Romeo Force and Poonch police personnel keep vigil at the LKG forest in Poonch, January 14, 2024, during a search operation. Photograph: ANI Photo The security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has been dynamic. In my opinion, newer hot spots could emerge wherever 'operational space' is available to the terrorists to gravitate. However, in this changing security situation, two factors have remained constant. [B]a.[/B] Pakistan continues to pursue sponsoring terrorism through her proxies as a State policy. [B]b.[/B] Security forces in Jammu & Kashmir, specially the Indian Army, have continued to function with utmost dedication and zeal and made repeated sacrifices to bring stability and calm to the region. In a situation of temporary setbacks, the security forces have shown resolve to bounce back and get on top of the situation. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/22security-forces1.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Security forces conduct a search operation in the forest area of Dera ki Gali. Photograph: ANI Photo The region has witnessed a cycle of violence in the past, both in the depth areas and along the Line of Control. As recently as early 2020, the LoC was active. High intensity ceasefire violations, raids on posts, ambushes, mutilation of bodies was happening. Whereas, the depth areas were calm and incident free for a long time. The Poonch and Rajouri areas have been activated by design. Probably the number of terrorists is not large, but they have fool-proof communication with handlers across the LoC who coordinate their logistics and provide operational directions. Terrorists in Poonch and Rajouri are not dependent on locals, therefore HUMINT [I][human intelligence][/I] is void. Why has this area been re-activated: [B]a.[/B] The counter terrorism grid is not as thick in Kashmir after troops were relocated to the Line of Actual Control. [B]b.[/B] The terrorists who were existing and lying dormant, know the area. The terrain favours them and Pakistan wants to keep the pot boiling, probably below our threshold level. The jungles pose additional challenges for the conduct of operations. Mountains with jungles further compound the problems. Visibility is restricted, so is the field of fire and engagement ranges. Area weapons like mortars and rocket launchers, MMGs [I][Medium Machine Guns][/I] etc are less effective. The logistics, casualty evacuation, movement of reserves is time consuming. The range of communication sets reduce and helicopters/drone support is difficult. The jungle terrain is favourable for small team ops and the one who knows the jungle can use it to his advantage. Trrorists in Poonch and Rajouri are operating from hideouts within the jungle. Their presence and movements are concealed; they carry out an incident and melt back. They periodically change hideouts and leave no tell-tale signs. Operations involving large body of troops is prone to detection, ambushes, IED etc. Cordon and search or seek and destroy operations can result in casualties and fatigue to troops. Troops trained to operate in small teams, self-contained for a protracted period, and who are able to conceal their presence are more effective in the jungles. They can be in the jungle, watch activity, choose the time and place and strike. Ops like ambushes and raids are more successful in jungles. Although basic training to soldiers includes some aspects of operations in jungles and the same is further refreshed during pre-induction training -- however, limited training only serves limited purpose. It meets the requirement of clearing small patches during ops with fire support to avoid casualties. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/27security4.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Security personnel keep vigil in the Poonch sector. Photograph: ANI Photo While the troop deployment along the LoC is to maintain the sanctity of the LoC, a strong anti-infiltration obstacle is in place to deny infiltration. Deployment on the LoC includes obstacles in the form of a formidable fence with a surveillance system, various kinds of sensors, cameras (day and night) and the LoC is manned by troops with weapons with day/night visions. All aspects are important. While technology is an enabler to improve efficiency and operational effectiveness of soldiers, training and proficiency of soldiers to use the ground to their advantage is equally important. However, overreliance on technology and ignoring human aspects is fraught with dangers. The Bakharwals and Gujjars of the Poonch and Rajouri area played a key role in improving the security situation. They stood up against the terrorists, assisted the Indian Army in clearance of Hill Kaka the so-called 'liberated area'. They have supported the Indian Army in the past; they do it now, and in my opinion, will continue to do so. The increase in terrorist incidents is not because the Bakharwals and Gujjars are not providing information. These terrorists who are active in Poonch and Rajouri are not relying on random locals for logistics, guidance [I]etc[/I]. They are being supported by a selected few who are being vetted, cleared and directed from across the LoC. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2023/dec/28rajnath-singh-army-visit4.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh meets with locals and officials in Rajouri. Jammu and Kashmir Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha, COAS General Manoj C Pande and Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General Upendra Dwivedi are also seen. Photograph: ANI Photo In the December 21 ambush, terrorists had positioned themselves on hill tops and chose a blind curve on the road to target army vehicles. This shows how well-informed they were about the terrain. Could you throw some light on the ecosystem that exists between terrorists, smugglers and local informants that enables such attacks? It's true that the terrorists selected an ambush site from where they could cause maximum damage and make a quick getaway. This indicates that they have received training from the Pakistan army. Also without guidance as recce, a copy book style action is difficult to execute. They surely would have received support and information from some over-the-ground workers who could freely move around and inform them of troop movement, numbers, timings, [I]etc[/I].It is the narco-smuggler nexus that is providing support. It is surely by design and directions from across the LoC. Probably to keep the pot boiling, they have chosen a favourable area. In Srinagar, as compared to Poonch and Rajouri, operations can be launched in a faster time-frame due to the terrain and thick counter-terrorism deployment. The flow of information to local police and Indian Army is more due to the density of population. The narco-smuggler nexus, supported through tactical drones, is strong in the Poonch and Rajouri region. Also, handlers are able to directly communicate with terrorists and selected over-the-ground workers without use of communication systems that can be intercepted and monitored.Also, due to relocation of forces to the Line of Actual Control, the already thin deployment has further depleted. Repeated incidents in Poonch and Rajouri is a matter of concern. Sacrifices made to bring peace to this area cannot be allowed to go in vain. While local formations will honestly draw lessons, make required corrections in operational techniques, battle procedures and drills, they will also deploy additional resources under their command and revisit training curriculum focussing on intelligence aspects. Some other measures that need to be considered are: [B]a.[/B] Deny operational space to the terrorists by deploying additional troops from outside the command theatre. [B]b.[/B] Counter infiltration grid in this area is strong, however an audit to identify weak spots and plug them is required. [B]c.[/B] Infusion of hi-tech equipment to improve operational effectiveness of the troops is urgently required. These include anti-drone systems, foliage penetration radars, precision strike tactical drones, communication interception equipment [I]etc[/I]. [B]d.[/B] Securing of lines of communication by forces other than the Indian Army needs to be considered. This will deny terrorists freedom of movement in vehicles from across the Poonch and Rajouri and from the International Border sector side. [B]e.[/B] The nexus between narco/smugglers and terrorists needs to be neutralised on priority. There is a requirement to go after the big players in the business rather than small time drug peddlers. This task cannot be left to local security forces/agencies, but a multi-agency effort at a higher level would yield results. [B]f.[/B] Right sizing of forces/drawing down of the Rashtriya Rifles needs to be reconsidered, especially in the light of commitment on the LAC and requirement of more boots on the ground in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism. [B]g.[/B] Lastly, handlers across the LoC should also feel the heat. They cannot sit in safe sanctuaries and perpetuate violence. A strong message to Pakistan that there cannot be business as usual on the LoC when depth areas are being targeted. Based an interview by Lieutenant General [B]Paramjit Singh Sangha[/B], former deputy chief of the army staff (strategy) by Rediff [/QUOTE]
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